



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## OUR INTEREST IN SAMOA.

BY THE HON. HENRY C. IDE, LATE CHIEF-JUSTICE OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF SAMOA.

---

ON the 14th day of June, 1889, the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, the German Empire, and the United States, at Berlin, agreed upon a treaty, or general act, the first article of which declared "that the islands of Samoa are neutral territory. . . . Neither of the powers shall exercise any separate control over the islands or the government thereof." The primary purpose of the treaty was to maintain the neutrality of the islands. The incidental objects were to prevent dissensions between the several governments, to provide for the security of aliens in Samoa, and, "as far as possible," to promote the interests of the Samoan people. The remaining articles provide machinery for accomplishing these results. The treaty, having been duly ratified, was followed by the organization of the new government nearly two years later, the Supreme Court first opening its doors in June, 1891.

*The Opposing Claims.*—This international compact has been the subject of earnest discussion in our country, especially during President Cleveland's second administration, and President Cleveland and Secretary Gresham repeatedly recommended a withdrawal from it by the United States. It is urged that the islands are unsuited in climate for the residence of white people; that commercially they are worthless; that the inhabitants are intractable; that the new government is expensive and annoying to our State Department; that it fails to secure the results hoped for; and that it involves an entangling foreign alliance, alien to our traditions and best interests.

Upon the other side it is said that our rights in Samoa already secured are most valuable; that its neutrality and independence are matters of great national importance; that the recent adverse

reports relating to its climate and commercial possibilities are contradictory to all former official reports, and come from persons especially appointed to make them, and who remained in Samoa only long enough to prepare them; that so far as the new government has been unsuccessful its failure has been largely due to the want of loyal support by the United States; that the new government has in fact accomplished all that could reasonably have been expected; that the expense of continuing it is too trivial to be worthy of consideration, and that we should retain the strong position which we have acquired. It is the purpose of the present article to throw such light upon this discussion as a residence in Samoa during the greater portion of the year 1891 as United States Land Commissioner, and from 1893 to 1897 as Chief Justice under the treaty, may enable the writer to give.

*The Treaty Was Our Deliberate Action.*—Historically considered, our present relation to Samoa has not been hastily or secretly adopted. It has slowly, year by year, in the light of repeated official reports, special commissions for purposes of investigation, ample discussion in Congress, by the press and in Presidential messages, assumed its present phase. If the treaty was a mistake, it was one deliberately made, with all the light now available, except that which has come from the short period of its practical working.

For more than twenty-five years we have had a Consular representative in Samoa to give us full information upon every detail. In 1872 the High Chief of Pago Pago granted to our government the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval station in that harbor. In 1873 President Grant sent a special agent to Samoa to investigate and report, whose exhaustive report was submitted to the Forty-third Congress. In 1877 a treaty was negotiated between the governments of Samoa and the United States, and ratified in 1878, wherein it was, among other things, provided that "naval vessels of the United States shall have the privilege of entering and using the port of Pago Pago, and establishing therein and on the shores thereof a station for coal and other naval supplies for their naval and commercial marine, and the Samoan government will hereafter neither exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction within said port adverse to such rights of the United States or restrictive thereof," and that, in case of

difficulties arising between Samoa and other nations, the government of the United States "will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those difficulties upon a satisfactory and solid foundation." This treaty was extensively discussed by the press. On its conclusion special reports upon the whole subject, commercial and political, were furnished to the State Department by its representative, Mr. Goward, who had accompanied the Samoan ambassador on his return to Samoa, and they were duly transmitted to the Forty-sixth Congress. In 1886 Hon. George H. Bates, the law partner of Secretary Bayard, was sent to Samoa by President Cleveland "as special agent to investigate and report." His report, together with those of similar German and English "special agents" appointed at the same time, were transmitted to the Fiftieth Congress. Mr. Bates' report was exhaustive, able, and truthful. In 1887 a conference between the authorized representatives of the three powers for the purpose of negotiating a treaty securing the autonomy and neutrality of Samoa was held at Washington and was "adjourned," because Secretary Bayard considered that the scheme proposed by the other negotiators secured to Germany too great a preponderance of influence in the proposed new government. In January, 1889, Hon. Harold M. Sewall, of Bath, Me., for five years our Consul General in Samoa, testified at great length, for several days, before the sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate, his examination covering every phase of the question, historical, political, and commercial. In 1889 Congress, after adequate discussion, with the recent and full light of Mr. Bates' report and Mr. Sewall's evidence, appropriated \$500,000 for the protection of our interests in Samoa. During all these years the subject was repeatedly brought to the attention of Congress by messages from successive Presidents. All this transpired before the negotiations of the Berlin act. It may, therefore, fairly be said that the treaty was a deliberate act of national policy in our international relations, entered into with sufficient knowledge of the subject in all its phases, and a knowledge far more reliable, considering the different sources from which it came and the length of time given for the correction of all errors, than any since acquired.

*It was a National, not a Political, Act.*—The treaty was in

no sense an act of partisan politics or for the furtherance of the policy of any political party. It is true that it was negotiated in the early months of President Harrison's administration, and was confirmed at a time when the Republicans controlled the Senate, and in that sense that party is responsible for it. But on President Harrison's advent to office, the question of our relations to Samoa was no longer an open one. We had assumed international positions upon that subject which could not be receded from with self-respect, and without disregard for that continuity of action in our relations with foreign powers which is essential to national dignity and good relations with other nations. President Cleveland in a special message to Congress in January, 1887, had said, "I have insisted that autonomy and independence of Samoa should be scrupulously preserved," a result which could be secured only by treaty. At the Washington Conference, when the first attempt to agree upon the treaty was made on June 25, 1887, Secretary Bayard submitted at the outset a plan for the new government of Samoa, the first article of which was: "The independence and autonomy of the kingdom composed of these islands are to be preserved free from the control or preponderating influence of any foreign government." One article proposed by Secretary Bayard was: "Each of the Treaty Powers will alternately keep four months in each year a man-of-war in Samoan waters, to assist in maintaining the government so to be established, and to preserve peace and order;" which clearly shows that it was not then contemplated that a new government should be established in an untried field, and then left to its fate without either physical or moral support. If we have departed from our traditional policy in our action in regard to Samoa, that departure was widest under President Cleveland's first administration. Prince Bismarck proposed a resumption of the conference, exciting events, to be hereafter referred to, having meanwhile intervened. On February 5, Secretary Bayard accepted the proposal in a letter to Count Arco, wherein he stated that the conference should "be renewed on the basis of the equal rights of the three Treaty Powers . . . and such a neutralization of territorial jurisdiction as will prevent preponderant control by any nation." The conference was thus agreed upon, as well as the general lines and scope of its work, in the closing month

of President Cleveland's administration, and President Harrison, coming into office on March 4, soon appointed John A. Kasson, William Walter Phelps, and George H. Bates, representing both political parties, as plenipotentiaries to negotiate the treaty.

*Its Fundamental Purpose.*—It will be observed that the primary object of all our actions relating to Samoa was not the development of commerce, or the rescue of the Samoans from their own internal conflicts. These latter objects, desirable and important as they are, were secondary and incidental, results to be hoped for as flowing from the means adopted for securing the neutralization of the Islands and the preservation of our rights at Pago Pago. Hence, all arguments based on the alleged failure of the treaty immediately to develop commerce in a country whose resources are still largely awaiting the vitalizing touch of industry, and to secure, as by a magic wand, the settled order and peace of old civilizations among a people who have never felt the restraining hand of a central authority, are largely, though not wholly, irrelevant. The important question is, was it unwise in a national sense to have attempted the neutralization of the Islands by international compact? For there was no other possible way to secure that result. It is a very late date to enter anew upon that discussion, after twenty years of prior consideration and the final assumption of international duties from the faithful performance of which we cannot recede without a humiliating admission of vacillation and improvident, though deliberate, action.

*Growing Importance of the Pacific.\**—In 1852, William H. Seward, in the United States Senate, said: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter." That prophecy is rapidly on the way towards fulfilment. Our own Pacific slope has nearly fifteen hundred miles of sea frontage and a population nearly equal to that of all the thirteen colonies when the Declaration of Independence was signed, while its internal and external commerce are increasing by leaps and bounds. To the north lies British Columbia, with its mines of gold and coal, its millions of acres of forest and its rich agricultural lands, opened to the Atlantic by a mag-

\* See Hon. Lorrin A. Thurston's article, NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, No. 461.

nificent railway system, and to all the Eastern lands by admirably equipped steamship lines. To the south lie the constantly developing countries of Mexico, Central America, Chile, and the other South American nations. On the southwest lie the British colonies, rapidly crystallizing into a great republican federation. To the west lies Japan, a country of forty million of marvellously enterprising and ingenious people, and China with her enormous population and immeasurable possibilities, now opening up to the world. To the northwest lies Siberia, the largest country in the world, in natural resources one of the richest, in the very act of being developed upon the Pacific Coast by a government of absolute power.

Nearly \$4,000,000 per annum are paid by Great Britain and her colonies for subsidies for steamship and cable communications in or to the Pacific. With the completion of the Nicaragua Canal there will pour into the Pacific by the new route to the Orient and to Australasia the measureless traffic between those countries and all our Atlantic seaboard and a considerable portion of Europe.

*International Importance of Samoa.*—In the centre of this ever-increasing commerce in the northern hemisphere lie the Hawaiian Islands, with no other neighboring group to diminish their importance. Laying aside the debatable question of the annexation of those islands, few can be found who would for a moment concede that the “moral suzerainty” which we have for many years maintained over them should be weakened in any degree. The attempt by any foreign power to seize them would be resented as an unfriendly act by any administration, and would be resisted by force, as has been substantially declared by Mr. Webster, Mr. Legaré, Mr. Clayton, Mr. Marcy, Mr. Fish, Mr. Blaine, Mr. Frelinghuysen, and Mr. Bayard.

In the South, Pacific European nations have been swift to seize upon the vantage points. With the French in Tahiti and New Caledonia, the Spanish in the Carolines and Philippines, the Germans in the Marshall Islands, New Guinea, New Britain, and other groups, and the British in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the Solomons, and many other groups, and exercising a practical protectorate over Tonga, there is no independent group left except Samoa. But these islands, lying south 10 degrees and west 173 degrees, are in the very path of commerce. They are

central to all movements in the South Pacific. Directly past them go all steamers between our Pacific coast and Australia. Here a Pacific cable will doubtless find one of its stations. Samoa stands as a sentinel and outpost in that vast southern sea, just as Hawaii does in the northern. If it is appropriated by any foreign power, we have no foothold left south of the equator, no place to which we can go as a matter of right. When we once relax our grasp we do so forever. Immediate annexation by England or Germany would follow, and those hands never open to release what they have closed upon.

*Our Interests at Pago Pago.*—Our modern warships are absolutely dependent on frequent coal supplies. As Mr. McAdoo said in his speech in the House: "All the greatest nations of the world are trying to secure for themselves places where they can get supplies of coal in emergencies. . . . This harbor of Pago Pago is a great advantage to us, and we have gotten it in an honorable way." Without criticising the opinions of respectable gentlemen who have never been within many miles of Pago Pago, but have recently officially reported that the harbor is of little value, it will be useful for a moment to see how it has been regarded by those who *have* seen it, and whose opinions are of especial value. In 1830 it was visited by that veteran missionary of the South Seas, John Williams, who reported that the harbor was an excellent one and should be acquired by England. In 1839 Admiral Wilkes visited it, and after describing it fully says: "This is of all the ports the best fitted for the refitting of vessels." In 1871 Captain Wakeman, sent out to report by the famous shipbuilder William H. Webb, wrote: "I found myself in the most perfectly land-locked harbor that exists in the Pacific Ocean," and gave full and satisfactory descriptions of widths, depths, landmarks, etc. In 1873 the British Consul at Samoa reported to his government the existence of an agreement transferring to the United States important concessions "in the magnificent harbor of Pago Pago," and expressed the hope that in case of failure of subsequent negotiations, "it may be possible to transfer the overtures of the chiefs to ourselves." In the very same year, the North German Confederation had instructed its Consul to secure the control of Pago Pago harbor, but he arrived too late. Our commander had completed his work. Our Commissioner, Mr. Goward, wrote from Pago Pago



in 1878: "The harbor of Pago Pago is the most important in the South seas." *Findlay's South Pacific Directory*, the standard of navigation for those waters, says of Pago Pago: "It is a deep, land-locked basin, of easy approach, and perfectly secure anchorage."

For the more perfect realization of the rights secured to us, Secretary Tracy ordered a survey of the harbor to be made, which was carried out under the direction of Admiral Kimberly, and the most valuable portions of the shore front, as selected by him, were purchased in fee in 1889 and 1890 and are now absolutely owned by the United States government. To the suggestion that we have not secured title to enough of the shore front, the obvious reply is that if Admiral Kimberly's judgment was at fault, the adequate remedy is to buy more land. There are no known obstacles in the way, either of fact or law. The Berlin Act recognizes the validity of the former treaty with the United States, and does not forbid the acquisition of land by our government. In fact, many of our present titles were acquired since the execution of the Berlin act and have long since been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Samoa.

No one has better stated, in brief form, the reasons for the treaty than did Secretary Bayard at the Washington conference, where he said to his associates:

"These islands lie in the pathway of a commerce that is just being developed. There is something beyond the mere material present value of the land or the products." In his instructions to Mr. Bates he wrote: "The Samoan Islands are to-day almost the sole remaining neutral territory in Oceanica. . . . The principle of neutralization is of special importance to the United States, for in no other part of Polynesia is a right of this nature possessed by them." In his instructions to the plenipotentiaries who negotiated the Berlin act, Secretary Blaine said: "The interests of the United States require the possession of a naval station in those remote parts of the Pacific, and by a treaty with the lawful authorities of Samoa they have been put in control of the harbor of Pago Pago for these purposes. We cannot consent to the institution of any form of government in Samoa subject directly or indirectly to influences which, in the contingencies of the future, might check or control the use or the development of this American right."

In the light of these facts it is a matter of surprise to read in Secretary Gresham's communication to President Cleveland of May 9, 1894, recommending substantially a withdrawal from the treaty, elaborate arguments based upon difficulties of administration, and its failure to increase our commerce, or to benefit the natives of Samoa, without the slightest mention of the fact that we had already acquired the shores of Pago Pago and that the security of our rights there and the neutralization of the islands were the prime factors which had controlled our action. The real question was absolutely untouched by the distinguished Secretary.

*Climatic and Commercial Considerations.*—A word should be said, incidentally, about the climate and possible resources and commerce of Samoa. The climate is necessarily tropical, and that imports such diseases as are incidental to tropical countries. An occasional year, like 1894, can be selected, when influenza or some fever has prevailed, which will show a high death rate among white residents. But there are no statistics existing, and no facts known, tending to show that Samoa is not one of the most salubrious of tropical countries. With a temperature in which sixty degrees and ninety degrees, Fahrenheit, are the extremes of heat and cold, relieved during the greater portion of the year by refreshing trade winds, with a luxuriant and marvellously beautiful tropical foliage, with absolute freedom from all noxious animals, and with a native population picturesque, kindly, polite, and hospitable, Samoa is in many respects a most delightful place of residence. The writer's own family, including three ladies, never, on the whole, before enjoyed as good health as during the years of their residence in Samoa. It was the only place in which Robert Louis Stevenson could enjoy life. In his own Scotland he must cling to the fireside or creep out of doors wrapped in a shawl. In his beloved Samoa he lived out of doors, rode horseback, took long excursions about the islands by boat, and was a man among men until the bursting of a blood vessel in his teeming brain ended his brilliant career. His family still live in the island home.

The soil is rich and productive. It supports a population of between 30,000 and 40,000 people in comparative idleness, while only mere fringes are yet under cultivation. He would be a rash man who would venture to say that the day would not come, and

at no remote date, when a great population would find its delightful home and abundant sustenance in these fruitful islands. The "Great American Desert," once denounced in the United States Senate, as unfit for human habitation, is now partially divided into great States, among the most prosperous in our Union. Fifty years ago little could be said of the Hawaiian Islands, except that there Captain Cook was murdered. To-day their commerce invites the heavily laden ships of many nations, but those of our own country incomparably beyond all others. Looking backward, what should we now say of the statesmanship that thirty, or even twenty, years ago would have allowed any European power to absorb Hawaii without remonstrance upon our part, upon the ground that its commerce was then insignificant, or that rebellion and political upheaval were imminent, or actually existing? In such a question, the possible future, not the insignificant and transient present, is to be the guide of wise political action.

*Abandonment of Samoa by President Cleveland.*—Manifestly no reasonable man could have expected that the treaty, under the best of circumstances, could prevent the depreciation in the world's market of the price of copra, the principal product of the Islands. That depreciation arose from increased production in other parts of the world. Its effect was necessarily to produce hardship and political discontent in Samoa, just as similar depreciation in the value of staple products in the United States produced similar results. Nor could it be expected that a new government, established among a people untrained to submission to a central authority, among whom the chief was the unit of political power, divided into factions with prejudices as bitter and deep as those of the ancient Scotch Highlanders, enjoying political excitement as the very breath of life, accustomed from time immemorial to settle their political and factional controversies by fighting, could heal these ancestral controversies and ensure established peace and good order, without substantial physical and moral support for a time. Water so long troubled could not be quieted by the mere command, "Peace, be still!" No one did so expect when the treaty was made.

At the Washington conference the fifteenth article of Secretary Bayard's proposal was: "Each of the Treaty Powers will alternately keep four months in the year a man-of-war in Samoa

to assist in maintaining the government so to be established and to preserve peace and order." Mr. Bates in his report says: "The central government must be, for a time at least, administered by the three Treaty Powers." On February 20, 1892, Secretary Blaine wrote to Sir Julian Pauncefote: "In order to carry out the spirit of the Berlin Treaty, it would be advisable for the Treaty Powers to sustain in some proper and judicious way the recognized authorities of Samoa, and suggests the use of men-of-war for that purpose, particularly in enforcing the warrants of the Supreme Court." On June 19, 1893, Secretary Gresham wrote to Sir Julian Pauncefote that the government of the United States "will join in an active demonstration for the purpose of surrounding Mataafa and his followers and disarming them."

But during the whole four years of President Cleveland's administration no American warship was ever seen in Samoan waters. In no single instance has the enforcement of any process of the Supreme Court of Samoa been aided, either physically or morally, by any warship or other aid furnished by the Powers. Meanwhile, not only did our government withhold its promised aid, but what was far more deleterious, it withdrew its moral support. The President in his annual messages for 1893-1894-1895 recommended a withdrawal from the treaty. This, of course, was known by all in Samoa. The factions of natives knew it, and that the Powers were not united in supporting the treaty. They naturally quickly join an opposition upon the least show of weakness. The desertion by the United States bore its legitimate fruit, and so-called civil war broke out. Under date of December 5, 1894, the United States Consul-General in Samoa wrote to the State Department: "That the United States is to withdraw is accepted as a fact by the general community." The *Samoa Herald* of September 12, 1896, editorially said: "The United States has evinced a positively disgraceful disregard of her obligations under the treaty. . . . She gave absolutely no assistance to the other Treaty Powers in quieting disturbances and restoring order here; not a vessel of her navy has deigned to call here for years, and the present administration has made frequent efforts to scuttle out of Samoa altogether. We admit that we have received from the United States an able judge. . . . So far as we know this is the only benefit America has conferred upon the country. In view of all this it certainly does seem rather

cool for the official representative of the United States to talk about some injustice to America which he does not define, and no one knows anything about." It is within the bounds of extreme moderation to say that so far as the new government has been successful, it has won that success under most adverse circumstances, and more in spite of the opposition of the United States government than by reason of its support. The wonder is, not that the success has not been greater, but that so much can be shown of good results in the face of great difficulties.

*Results Secured by the Treaty.*—For the treaty can show some positive results that are worthy of consideration. It should first be viewed with reference to the conditions existing at the time it was negotiated. The danger that is past soon becomes, in public consideration, the danger that never existed. But in 1887 and 1888 the relations between our country and Germany had become strained to the danger point. In the face of a mutual understanding to the contrary, Germany had by force attempted to seize Samoa. The natives of that country were divided into hostile camps of armed warriors, one supported by German arms, and one by British Colonials and citizens of the United States. More than fifty young and brave German sailors had been killed or wounded in a single battle wherein the opposing force was openly supplied with arms, ammunition, food, courage, and brains by American citizens. Actual, though not nominal, warfare existed between Germans and Americans in Samoa. Martial law was proclaimed in Apia by the German officials, and the attempt was made to enforce it upon American citizens. Two German warships and three bearing the Stars and Stripes were crowded into the little harbor of Apia.

Commander Leary, of the United States warship "Adams," on September 6, 1888, formally wrote to Captain Fritze, of the German corvette "Adler": "I hereby respectfully and solemnly protest in the name of the United States of America and of the civilized world in general against the use of a national war vessel for such service as was yesterday rendered by the German corvette 'Adler.'" Commander Leary also formally notified the German ruler of Samoa, that any violation of the rights of American citizens by his authority "would be considered a just and sufficient cause for such action as may be deemed proper." Whatever the meaning of these communications may

have been, they clearly were not pacific; coming from a warship they were decidedly threatening. The Navy Department instructed our commanders "to interfere vigorously should occasion arise to protect the persons and property of American citizens." Marines were landed to protect the American consulate, and there to furnish a refuge for our citizens. Our grievances were in part thus stated by Secretary Blaine: "To subject the citizens of the United States to the inspection of the German navy; to require reports from each household as to arms kept for its necessary protection; to make permission from the German authorities a needed prerequisite to the natural right of American citizens to guard themselves from danger; to inquire into the character of even their rumored conversations and hold them answerable therefor to the summary proceedings of a German court-martial. All these were trials and indignities to which they ought never to have been subjected." The press teemed with inflammatory condemnations of German aggressions. Congress appropriated \$500,000 for the defence of our interests in Samoa. Stocks were affected. A single indiscreet act might have precipitated hostilities. Many of the wars of modern times have sprung from conditions far less critical. At such a moment, the proposition for a renewal of the negotiations of a treaty securing the neutrality and autonomy of Samoa came upon the scene like a benediction. War was averted. Honorable peace was secured without surrender of national dignity or the abandonment of a single right. The friendship of two great nations, already sadly strained, was renewed. There are those who consider this one fact far more than adequate compensation for all that the treaty has cost, and that the treaty, instead of being an "entangling alliance," relieved us from a most dangerous situation. In the next place, it has secured the neutrality and autonomy of the Islands, perfected our titles to the lands on the shores of Pago Pago harbor for a coaling station, and has given us a standing ground and substantial position of influence in the South Seas, from which we cannot be dislodged without our own consent. On the other hand, it has preserved the native Samoans from falling absolutely upon the tender mercies of the Germans.

Again, it has secured to our citizens now resident in Samoa, and to such of them as shall hereafter carry our flag and our

commerce thither, absolute equality with all others in trade and protection of the laws and freedom from aggressions by other nationalities. Those who are familiar with the utter annihilation of American trade in the Marshall Islands by unjust discriminations in favor of German merchants in customs and other legal exactions will know that German protection in Samoa would have meant not merely the ruin of all our countrymen now resident there, but also our permanent exclusion from all commercial facilities in the future.

Again, the great majority of aliens reside in Apia. By the treaty the Municipal District of Apia was created with special powers of local government. That municipality is as well governed as municipal corporations of its size are in old civilized countries. It has an elective council, efficient police, a municipal court, lighted streets, valuable land and building for customs sheds and police court, and approximately ten miles of road, all well rounded and ditched, and nearly one-half of it macadamized with the cheap and useful coral and gravel immediately at hand. After sixty years of partial occupancy by missionaries and traders at the time the treaty was made, only two pleasure carriages had, during all those years, ventured into the country. Now there are nearly one hundred in Apia alone. More progress has been made in the municipality in the way of acquisition of public property, facilities for extinguishing fire and the building of roads and bridges within the six years since the treaty went into actual operation than in all the sixty prior years. All this has been done under adverse circumstances, but without incurring debt.

Again, until the treaty was made, the Samoan government had not where to lay its head. The peninsula near Apia, where the government was supposed to have its seat, was claimed by the Germans, and the government did not own an acre of land. Now the German claim upon the peninsula has been satisfied and the government owns the property in fee. Upon it have been erected valuable government buildings. A fair carriage road westerly for thirty miles along the north shore of the Island of Upolu has been built and opened to travel within the last year. While road building has really only begun, yet more has been done in that direction since the making of the treaty than in all time before that date. In all this the government has paid its own way. It is not in debt.

Again, the provisions of the treaty prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to natives are well enforced, and are exceedingly valuable. Public sentiment favors their enforcement. A drunken native is a rare sight. The fine-looking and courtly Samoan race is at present in no danger of the degeneration and annihilation that come to all aboriginal races in the presence of the unstinted use of alcoholic drinks.

Again, all authorities agree that the confusion of land titles was one of the most fruitful sources of friction between natives and aliens. Foreigners held deeds from natives of far more land than there was in all Samoa. Many of the titles were fraudulent, and conflicted with one another. There was no court competent to deal with the question, and no one could safely invest money in land or develop industries until titles were settled. All progress was necessarily stayed. The treaty provided adequate tribunals for undertaking this great work, which has now been brought to a successful conclusion. Hundreds of thousands of acres have been restored to natives. They are not to be a homeless people in their own country. They have abundant fertile land to supply their wants and those of their posterity for all time. Their title is absolute, and the treaty prohibits further alienation by them except under the strictest supervision of the Chief Justice. The benefit to the Samoans is incalculable. But, on the other hand, the benefit to aliens is equally great. Every alien title has been finally passed upon by the court, and unsalable grants have been issued. A complete system of registration of titles has been adopted. Every acre of alien land in Samoa can "read its title clear." In no country can more certainty of a solid title be obtained. Capital can now be safely invested in lands. Controversies with natives are largely ended by the removal of this great cause of friction. The most perplexing of all questions in New Zealand and Fiji has for many years been the obtaining of good titles to native lands. That work has all been finished quickly and cheaply in Samoa. In this respect the treaty has deserved and received the gratitude of Samoans and foreigners alike, and has amply vindicated the wisdom of its authors.

Finally the establishment of the Supreme Court has secured important results. Before the treaty the attendance of parties or witnesses could not be compelled, except in the Consulate of



the defendant, and there other nationals could not be compelled to appear as witnesses. No court had general jurisdiction. An American aggrieved by a German must remain without redress or go into the German Consulate to try his case, by German law, before a German judge. The new court, administering a uniform system of English law, having jurisdiction over all controversies between different nationals, revising judgments of native tribunals, freed from national prejudices by the international character of its appointment, has commanded respect and obedience, and has proved a useful object lesson to the teachable Samoans. In a very few instances its authority has been defied temporarily by rebellious natives in remote parts of the islands, but in nearly every such instance the matter in controversy has ultimately been properly adjusted. All this has been accomplished wholly by moral force, without the aid of the Powers in a single instance.

Manifestly some of the important results hoped for have been secured, and Secretary Gresham's official declaration that, "the expenses, the responsibilities, and the entanglements have so far been its only fruits," would seem somewhat overdrawn.

*Objections Considered.*—But something more specific should be said upon the subject of expenses and difficulties. The expenses of negotiating the treaty, paying the first year's salary of the Chief Justice, and the cost of the International Land Commission were large, and were borne by the three Powers equally. The Commission finished its work in 1894. All the items of large expense are past. Since the first year, the new government has paid its own way without assistance except as to the items next to be mentioned. It might be thought that, inasmuch as we *had* incurred large expenditures in the initial work of the treaty, and as that expense was now ended, that fact was an argument for holding on to the treaty and realizing the benefit of our investment. The maintenance of a Consul in Samoa is no part of the expense of the treaty. We had one in Samoa many years before the treaty was thought of. The only known expenses which our government has incurred in relation to Samoa since 1894, aside from the expense for surveying, are one-third of the expenses of maintaining Mataafa and his associate rebels in the Marshall Islands, and the transportation expenses of the two foreign officials,

the Chief Justice and President of the municipality of Apia, whenever new officials are appointed. The former item, support of Mataafa and the chiefs, costs our government less than \$500 per annum, and this expense is temporary. The other item, transportation, occurs only about once in four years and at the highest estimate will not cost more than \$800 per year on the average. The actual expense to our government of continuing the treaty will apparently be less than \$1,500 per year, a petty sum to be made the ground of receding from our solemn international compact. Even if the new government should occasionally receive a little assistance, every River and Harbor Appropriation Bill in Congress dedicates a far larger amount for improving some mud creek, in the name of promoting commerce, than will be required for maintaining our hold upon a group of islands lying in the very pathway of enormous commercial interests. If a warship should occasionally be sent by us to Samoa, as is done by the other Powers, and as should be done by us, the cost is no more than that of maintaining the warships in other remote parts of the world where they carry our flag. Congress did not consider \$500,000 too great a sum to be appropriated for the protection of our interests in Samoa. The native troubles, though greatly to be deplored, have been magnified enormously in official and other correspondence. Samoa is an international megaphone. The firing of a few muskets in a bush scrimmage there seems to echo and re-echo all over the world, and to be amplified into salvos of artillery and volleys from great armies. The killed and wounded in all the fighting in Samoa during the last seven years would not equal the number of dead and maimed in a single railway accident in the United States. Not a foreigner has been touched, nor has his property been invaded by reason of those hostilities, except by the petty stealing incident to disturbed conditions. Absolute peace has prevailed for nearly three years. It is of little importance to aliens whether all Samoans do or do not recognize allegiance to King Malietoa as long as they keep the peace. The treaty recognizes their right to govern themselves in their own way in all particulars save those specially otherwise provided for. Some disturbances were to be expected in such a country as Samoa. They were, are, and will be inevitable. Even in our own country, which we are wont to

regard as the final fruition of the teachings of all the ages in good government, we read of more lynchings than legal executions year by year ; we see governors of a great State vainly trying for years to execute criminal process upon Jesse James, and finally succeeding only by the aid of hired assassins ; our Indian Territory filled with murder and violence, railway trains wrecked and robbed, and the commerce of half a continent paralyzed by unrestrained mobs. Surely we may excuse poor Samoa if she does not instantly abandon all her old ways, and leap at one bound into the blessings of perfect order and peace. The life of any decently behaved white man is as secure in any portion of Samoa as in the most quiet hamlet of rural New England.

It has been a subject of unfriendly comment that the King of Samoa receives a mean and insignificant allowance. This is true. But it is equally true that he receives far more, and with far more regularity, than either he or any other King of Samoa ever received before the making of the treaty. His condition in that respect has been greatly improved by the treaty. According to the official publication entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1889*, page 324, the first item in Samoan budgets of expenditure was : "Two Kings at \$500 each. . . . \$1,000," Clearly, kings were far cheaper in those days than now, when a single one receives \$1,800 per year from the Treasury, and an abundance of all he needs, supplied to him by his people.

Some criticism has been made upon the salaries paid to the two foreign officials, and their expenses, but it is a just measure of the reasonableness of these expenditures to say that the whole expenses of maintaining the Samoan government, including the salaries of the two foreign officials, but not including the other expenses of the municipality of Apia, are less than those of the German Consular office in Apia, with its staff and offices. The German government is not accustomed to extravagance, but does believe in the utility of a well-trained and well-paid Consular service. That there are defects in the treaty, shown by its practical working, particularly in its unjust and unworkable provisions for taxation, is true. This was anticipated. The treaty provided that, "Upon the request of either Power, after three years from the signature hereof, the Powers shall consider by common accord what ameliorations, if any, may be introduced into the provisions of their general act."

*Future Action.*—In the face of successive recommendations of a withdrawal from the treaty by President Cleveland, Congress has taken no action. Manifestly the country did not respond to the President's appeals. The question is not, shall we enter upon a career of extension and annexation in the Pacific? That question is closed. The field is occupied; everything in the Pacific, except Hawaii and Samoa, has been annexed and appropriated by other Powers.

The real questions are, having secured the autonomy and neutrality of Samoa by the only available means, shall we now permit the islands to be appropriated by a European power? Having in an honorable way acquired valuable rights in one of the best harbors in the Pacific, shall we fling them from us? Having deliberately and with full knowledge entered into an international compact which forever made secure to us rights, and the only remaining possible ones, in the centre of a vast commerce, shall we voluntarily release our grasp? Having incurred a large expenditure of money, and devoted years of careful diplomatic action to obtain what we have, shall all the results be passed over for the sole benefit of other nations? Having by practical experience learned the imperfections in present conditions, should we not be short-sighted indeed, if, instead of arranging "ameliorations" of those conditions, we were irretrievably to throw away all the future?

HENRY C. IDE.